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Research Question
Is Assembly Bill 109 an effective means for reducing California’s prison
population and recidivism rates in order to comply with the United States Supreme
Court’s mandate to reduce prison overcrowding?

Introduction
California has been ordered by the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) to
reduce unconstitutional prisoner overcrowding in its state prison system. Possible
solutions for achieving this mandate are to build more prisons, transfer prisoners out of
state, or to establish a realignment policy that would send low-level non-violent offenders
to county jails rather than state prisons. Since the state is struggling economically,
building more prisons is untenable. AB 109 and its prisoner realignment plan seem to
offer a positive alternative. Transferring jurisdictional control of specified convicts to
county jails will reduce the number of prisoners entering the state prisons (Harvard Law
Review, 2010). If implemented and funded properly through the provisions of its trailer
bills, “AB 109 will reduce the number of offenders in the state prison system and assist in
minimizing the state of California’s fiscal crisis” (Santa Clara County, 2011, p. 4). This
research has analyzed the effectiveness of the policy after six months of implementation,
has offered recommendations for future development, and has outlined future areas of
research that are necessary to determine the policy’s overall success.
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Historical Background
In 1851, California opened its first prison, San Quentin. One hundred and fifty
years later, San Quentin remains fully operational and houses death row inmates. Over
the last century and a half, California has added to its stock of prisons. According to the
California Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections’ (CDCR, 2011) website, there
are currently thirty-three adult correctional institutions, thirteen adult community
correctional facilities, and eight juvenile facilities in the California state prison system
(CDCR, 2011). As of September 7, 2011, these prisons housed more than 145,000 adult
offenders and nearly 3,200 juvenile offenders. The total inmate population makes the
CDCR the largest state-run prison system in the United States (CDCR, 2011).
In the early 1980s and 1990s, California’s prisons began to exceed their capacity.
In 1980, California housed 23,264 inmates in twelve prisons (CDCR, 2011). However,
owing to a combination of strict sentencing laws (especially the Three Strikes Law),
determinate sentencing guidelines, and the “war on drugs,” the state of California was on
track to develop the largest prison population of any state in the nation.
From 1980 to 2000 California’s inmate population increased by 554%, adding
137,391 inmates for a total of 160,655 by the beginning of 2000 (CDCR, 2011). In the
same time span, the state added twenty-one new correctional facilities, costing the
taxpayers billions of dollars in construction and operation costs. Due to this increase in
incarceration, the state budget for the CDCR increased from $3.5 billion in 1998 to $10.3
billion in 2009 (CDCR, 2011). California’s prison expenditures have risen to ten percent
of the State's budget in 2011, when they were only four percent in the mid 1980s (Rogan,
2012). More specifically, the average cost per inmate in the state of California increased
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to $48,536 per year by 2009 (Harvard Law Review, 2010).
The history of the deterioration of the California state prison system spans
decades, and may be attributed to Governor Brown introducing determinate sentencing in
1977. Determinate sentencing limited the discretion of not only the judges, but of parole
boards, as well (Harvard Law Review, 2010).
Over the next quarter century, new laws made prison terms even longer. The
California motto “tough on crime” established an attitude that led to one of the most
notable corrections laws ever created: Three Strikes (The Economist, 2011). The
introduction of the Three Strikes Law has contributed to California’s having the nation’s
highest number of incarcerated offenders with life imprisonment terms (Moore, 2007).
What is the purpose of prisons? Is it to punish the criminal, to rehabilitate, to deter
others from crime, or to protect the public from dangerous individuals? Most believe that
it is necessary to incarcerate violent repeat offenders, but should non-violent offenders be
locked up with the violent offenders in state prisons? (Haley, 2010). If prisoner
realignment works to divert prisoners from state prisons to county jails, will that
adequately reduce prison populations? The introduction of AB 109 and its trailer bills
may offer one solution to California’s prison problem, but at the expense of county
governments. If the policy succeeds, California should expect to see a drop in state
inmates and related operations costs. However, costs and overcrowding may pass to the
county level unless sentencing reforms accompany the new housing plan.
California’s legislature needs to establish proactive oversight for AB 109 that
strictly enforces, funds, and maintains the revenue stream to ensure proper
implementation. Although the Legislative Analyst’s Office estimates how much funding
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will be required for the realignment process, the funding sources assigned to the program
–1.0625 cents of the sales tax rate and $12 of the $25 vehicle license fee (VLF) – are
sensitive to economic circumstances and may be inadequate to meet the needs of prisoner
housing diverted to the county jails (Taylor, 2011).

Literature Review
As of September 2011, California incarcerated close to 144,000 inmates in its
state prisons. This number fell in recent years owing to the pressure from SCOTUS and
California policy changes. In 2006, California had a peak incarceration rate of 172,000
inmates (Rogan, 2012). Since 1970, California has seen 750% rise in incarceration levels,
especially during the “war on drugs” campaign during the 1990s (Harvard Law Review,
2010, p. 753).
With no end in sight to the rapidly growing number of inmates in California’s
state prisons, the CDCR was challenged to manage the growing population. New prison
construction was a short-term solution as the number of prisoners continued to rise and
budgets continued to fall, limiting construction funding (Rogan, 2012).
As the economy worsened, so did the wellbeing of California’s inmate
population. There were many human rights violations, including inadequate healthcare,
overcrowded living conditions, and lack of rehabilitation programs. Prisoners filed
lawsuits against the CDCR for Eighth Amendment violations. Two key court cases led to
the Supreme Court mandate to reduce the prison population and the AB 109 solution.
Court Cases: Coleman v. Brown and Plata v. Brown
Two court cases helped reform in California’s prison policy. In Coleman v. Brown
(1990), the court ordered a reduction in California’s prison population to provide
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constitutional levels of medical and mental health care, demonstrating the court’s ability
to generate a comprehensive remedial solution to prison overcrowding (Harvard Law
Review, 2009). “The California governor and corrections officials have been sued by
California prisoners for violating their rights under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause for being deprived of adequate health care” (Spector, 2010,
p. 1). The safe operation of a prison is impossible with severe overcrowding (Spector,
2010). In a similar case filed approximately a decade later in Plata v. Brown (2001), the
court ruled that the CDCR failed to provide adequate medical services and consequently
violated the Eight Amendment (Rogan, 2012). The outcomes of these cases led to a
court-ordered reduction in overcrowding, and because of the poor level and standards of
prisoner healthcare, the California prison system was forced to change prisoners’
housing. One California prisoner dies every eight days for lack of sufficient medical care
(Vesley, 2011). According to Vesely, this is egregious, and the prison system needs to be
reformed to meet the Supreme Court ruling (Vesely, 2011).
SCOTUS ruled that overcrowding and poor conditions in California state prisons
violated inmates' constitutional rights and ordered California to rapidly decrease its
inmate population. Many inmates sleep in gyms, dayrooms, and other areas not intended
for housing purposes (Gale, 2008). In 2011, Governor Jerry Brown and the Legislature
approved a plan that would relocate low-level (non-serious), non-violent, non-sexual
offenders (known as “the three-nons”) into the jurisdictional control of the counties in
which they were arrested. Furthermore, the Governor’s plan allowed offenders to be
released to the county probation system instead of the parole board (Medina, 2011).
The Court’s order is part of a two-decade long battle over medical and mental
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health care in California prisons (Harvard Law Review, 2010). The first of the two cases
was originally filed on April 23, 1990. In Coleman v. Brown, a United States magistrate
judge found that the CDCR did not provide adequate healthcare to their inmates and
therefore was in violation of the United States’ Eighth Amendment (Harvard Law
Review, 2010). The second case of Plata v. Brown was filed in 2001. This case
followed the precedent set in the Coleman case. Plata v. Brown argued that the CDCR
violated not only the Eighth Amendment, but also the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rogan, 2012). Judge Henderson, who was
hearing the Plata case in 2005, put the entire CDCR healthcare system on receivership. A
little more than a year later, the judge hearing the Coleman case ordered California to
create a program to improve the state’s healthcare for inmates in prison (California
Health Line, 2005).
Following these recommendations, the cases of Coleman v. Brown and
Plata v. Brown were to be jointly heard by a three-judge panel. Primarily, this joint suit
focused on the insufficient care for inmates that left mental illnesses untreated and
delivered medical care at inadequate levels. Throughout the long court hearings, court
delays, and interventions, the plaintiffs in Plata v. Brown finally made some headway for
resolution (Rogan, 2012).
By the time that the three-judge panel passed judgment on the Plata v. Brown
case, the total inmate population was nearly 160,000 (Rogan, 2012). The CDCR prison
facilities were built to house only half that number. Plata v. Brown maintained that the
only solution for reform of California’s inadequate prisoner healthcare provision would
be to reduce the number of inmates closer to the design population. “Under the Prison
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Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a court may order reductions in the prison population, but
only a three-judge court may do so” (Rogan, 2012). The panel ordered the state to reduce
the population to 137% of the design capacity within two years (The Economist, 2011).
The panel also required California to formulate a plan for their approval that would
achieve compliance with the court’s decision.
The Coleman and Plata cases revealed that the overcrowding not only deprived
prisoners of reasonable privacy, it also diminished the per capita funding for health and
mental health care. The AB 109 solution is to divert into the county jail system the
“three-nons” or the least dangerous criminals – non-serious, non-violent, and non-sexual
offenders serving sentences of three years or less (The Economist, 2011). By reducing the
population of the state’s prisons, the per capita funding for mandated health and mental
health care should rise to acceptable levels (The Economist, 2011).
According to the CDCR, in 1989, the original design capacity of California’s
prisons was 48,311. This number reflects a one prisoner per cell design. California’s
lawmakers, courts, and Governor used this number to establish a baseline for
overcrowding (Rushford, 2012). Comparing that number to the current inmate population
demonstrates a dramatic increase in overcrowding. According to the Criminal Justice
Legal Foundation, the state’s prison population from 1989 to 2007 “has been roughly
double the design capacity every year” (Rushford, 2012, p. 4). These findings show that
the CDCR’s current inmate housing policy is unsustainable, and realignment is needed to
reduce the population of California’s prisons to a level closer to the design capacity. The
chart below compares the population of the prisons with the existing design capacity
between 1989 and 2007, showing the levels of overcrowding.

California Realignment: Assembly Bill (AB) 109

11

Figure 1: Population & Design Capacity.

Source: Rushford, 2012, p. 3.

During that same timeframe, while California’s inmate population more than doubled, the
state tripled its spending on CDCR from $67 billion in 1989 to $183 billion in 2007
(Rushford, 2012). Figure 2 depicts the state of California’s rising costs for the CDCR.
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Figure 2: California Budget Expenditure.

Source: Rushford, 2012, p. 4.
In 2011-2012 the state allocated just over 10% of the entire state budget to the
CDCR (CDCR, 2012).
In January, a report by the Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) specified that the
ensuing savings could be projected from the implementation of AB109 (McCray, 2012,
p. 10):
•

$435 million in savings to local law enforcement grant programs

•

$86 million in net savings related to low-level offenders and parolees, as
well as undetermined amounts related to fewer prison construction
projects.
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2012-13 budget projects state savings of $454.3 million during 2012 and
$1.1 billion over the budget year.

As of April 23, 2012, California corrections officials questioned whether AB 109
alone would enable them to achieve compliance with the Supreme Court’s mandated
overcrowding reduction. While 10,000 prisoners get released from California’s prisons
each month (Steigerwald, 2012), new prisoners are sentenced every week, and only those
in the “three-nons” categories can be housed in county jail. If the incidence of crime
outside of the “three-nons” categories rises, the diversion of these prisoners may not be
adequate to generate a net reduction in prison population sufficient to meet the courtordered level. The state will ask the court to raise the limit by 6,000 inmates to a capacity
of 145% of original design capacity (Merigan, 2012).
The SCOTUS ruling, with a majority vote of 5 to 4 on May 23, 2011, set the
terms of a population limit, and stated that it was necessary for the state to comply with
prisoners’ constitutional rights, and limit overcrowding, a reduction of approximately
46,000 inmates, over the span of three years (The Economist, 2011). Reducing the
inmate population in California’s state prisons should help make adequate the capacity in
medical and health facilities, conditions for personnel, staff, and other inmates safer, and
increase the likelihood for healthcare to be effective and efficient (Rogan, 2012).
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, the California prison system was at 190%
of its originally designated capacity (Harvard Law Review, 2010). The SCOTUS
mandate directed the state of California to be at 135 % of capacity, or 110,000 inmates,
by June, 2013. Furthermore, the system was ordered to reach a reduced population goal
of 133,000 by December, 2011, meaning that 10,000 inmates needed to be transferred
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within the first few months of the realignment process (Medina, 2011). The SCOTUS
decision itself did not order prisoner releases. California adopted AB 109 as the best
possible solution to meet the mandate handed down by the courts to ease overcrowding in
California prisons. The figure below shows how California is reducing state inmates in
comparison to the SCOTUS mandate timeline.
Figure 3: SCOTUS and California Timeline Comparison.

Source: Misczynski, D. (2011), p. 22.
AB 109 and Its Trailer Bills
AB 109’s projected impact is to reduce the levels of overcrowding. If it is
successful, California’s failing prison system can generate a comprehensive remedial
solution to prison reform (Harvard Law Review, 2009). The plan of action to reduce
overcrowding in California’s prison system is Assembly Bill (AB) 109 and AB 118. This
well-documented plan establishes a solution for the state of California to help reduce the
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number of inmates across the state’s 33 adult prisons. The bill was signed on April 4,
2011, and its effective implementation date was October 1, 2011 (CDCR, 2011). The
state will continue to monitor those released prior to October 1, 2011 (CDRC, 2011).
AB 109 consists of the following key points (CDCR, p. 3):
•

Prisoners that are currently in California state prison will not be
transferred to county jails.

•

There will not be a specified early prisoner release for current inmates.

•

Any offender sent to California state prison recently will continue to serve
the entire sentence in state prison.

•

Any offender convicted of serious violent offenses, sex offenses, and sex
offenses against children will go to state prison.

Proponents of the proposed prison realignment include the California Police Chiefs’
Association and California Sheriffs’ Association. Their analysis states that AB 109 is the
only plan that can help reduce overcrowding in California’s prisons without exacerbating
the existing state deficit. However, the current plan is funded through a diversion of
Vehicle Licensing Fee (VLF) funds from local government road repairs to state prisoner
subsidies paid to the receiving county (Villacorte, 2011). “The realignment package
includes $6.3 billion in 2011-12 for court security, adult offenders and parolees, public
safety grants, mental health services, substance abuse treatment, child welfare programs,
adult protective services, and California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids
(CalWORKs)” (Taylor, 2011, p. 6).
The funding for the realignment of jurisdictional control over specified convicts
from the state to the counties is critical to ensure public safety and a responsible and
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effective form of punishment (California Budget, 2011), while reducing overcrowding.
The CDCR expects to meet the projected date set for compliance in 2013. Updates issued
by the CDCR show that they intend to reduce their inmate population to 147% of prison
design capacity by the SCOTUS pending date of December 27, 2012 (CDCR, 2011).
Below a chart depicts how the State of California will meet the mandated inmate
population in their state prisons.
Figure 4: Court Ordered Targets.

Source: CDCR, 2012.
Dedicated funding needs to be in place to ensure that the mandated timeline for
prisoner capacity is met. Under the current funding plan, the state’s formula used to
allocate funding for AB 109 includes three elements: “60 percent based on the estimated
average daily population of offenders meeting AB 109 eligibility criteria; 30 percent
based on U.S. Census Data pertaining to the total population of adults in the County as a
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percentage of statewide population; and 10 percent based on the SB 678 distribution
formula” (McCray, 2012, p. 10). The newly implemented realignment plan was also
fortified with a series of trailer bills that provided for the financial structure to support the
court-mandated population reduction in the state’s prisons.
AB 118 creates the structure for the financial allocations that support the inmate
realignment. The state legislature approved funding of realignment through the diversion
of a portion of the California state sales tax (1.0625 cents) and through diverting $12 of
the $25 VLF to the counties (CDCR, 2011). The diversion of the sales tax revenue is
estimated to create $5.1 billion in funding for realignment in 2011-12. SB 89, also
attached to AB 109, provides for the diversion of a portion of the VLF, which was
originally designed as a source of funding for the DMV, road repair, and transportation
for cities. “In addition, the realignment plan redirects an estimated $453 million from the
base 0.65 percent VLF rate for local law enforcement grant programs. Under prior law,
these VLF revenues were allocated to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) ($300
million) for administrative purposes and to cities and Orange County ($153 million) for
general purposes” (Taylor, 2011, p. 7). Both houses of the California legislature passed
this action in the 2011-2012 budget. Of the trailer bills passed by the legislature, SB 89’s
key impact increased the motor vehicle registration fee by $12 per automobile to offset
the lost revenue. If the revenue projections are accurate, there should be no impact to the
DMV and local transportation departments owing to the backfilling of VLF through the
added $12 increase (Taylor, 2011). A breakdown of AB 109’s trailer bills is depicted in
the following table (CDCR, 2012).
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Table A: Funding of AB 109’s Trailer Bills.
AB	
  111	
  

Gives	
  counties	
  additional	
  flexibility	
  to	
  access	
  funding	
  to	
  increase	
  
local	
  jail	
  capacity	
  for	
  the	
  purpose	
  of	
  implementing	
  Realignment	
  
AB	
  94	
  
Lowers	
  the	
  County’s	
  required	
  contribution	
  from	
  25%	
  to	
  10%,	
  and	
  
additionally	
  requires	
  CDCR	
  and	
  the	
  Corrections	
  Standard	
  Authority	
  
to	
  give	
  funding	
  preference	
  to	
  those	
  counties	
  that	
  relinquish	
  local	
  jail	
  
construction	
  conditional	
  awards	
  and	
  agree	
  to	
  continue	
  to	
  assist	
  the	
  
state	
  in	
  siting	
  re-‐entry	
  facilities.	
  
AB	
  118	
  
Outlines	
  the	
  financial	
  structure	
  for	
  allocating	
  funds	
  to	
  a	
  variety	
  of	
  
accounts	
  for	
  realignment.	
  Establishes	
  the	
  Local	
  Revenue	
  Fund	
  2011	
  
for	
  receiving	
  revenue	
  and	
  appropriates	
  from	
  that	
  account	
  to	
  the	
  
counties.	
  Directs	
  the	
  deposit	
  of	
  revenues	
  associated	
  with	
  1.0625	
  
cents	
  of	
  the	
  state	
  sales	
  tax	
  rate	
  to	
  be	
  deposited	
  in	
  the	
  Fund.	
  
Establishes	
  a	
  reserve	
  account	
  should	
  revenues	
  come	
  in	
  higher	
  than	
  
anticipated.	
  	
  
SB	
  89	
  
Diverts	
  $12	
  of	
  the	
  Vehicle	
  License	
  Fee	
  to	
  the	
  Fund.	
  Revenue	
  comes	
  
from	
  two	
  sources;	
  freed	
  up	
  VLF	
  previously	
  dedicated	
  to	
  DMV	
  
administration	
  and	
  VLF	
  that	
  was	
  previously	
  dedicated	
  to	
  cities	
  for	
  
general-‐purpose	
  use.	
  This	
  bill	
  also	
  imposes	
  an	
  increase	
  in	
  the	
  VLF	
  
fee	
  of	
  $12	
  per	
  car	
  to	
  recover	
  the	
  diverted	
  funds.	
  
SB	
  87	
  
Provides	
  counties	
  with	
  a	
  one-‐time	
  appropriation	
  of	
  $25	
  million	
  to	
  
cover	
  costs	
  associated	
  with	
  hiring,	
  retention,	
  training,	
  data	
  
improvements,	
  contracting	
  costs,	
  and	
  capacity	
  planning	
  pursuant	
  to	
  
each	
  County’s	
  AB	
  109	
  implementation	
  plan.	
  
Source of Data: CDCR, 2012
AB 118 and SB 89 play pivotal roles in the success of AB 109. The diverted VLF
and the portion of state sales tax are the main sources of funding dedicated to cover the
costs of the realignment plan (CDCR, 2011). According to the CDCR’s fact sheet,
approximately $400 million was provided to the counties in 2011-2012, with an
estimated $850 million for 2012-2013, and a projection of $1 billion in 2013-2014
(CDCR, 2012). It is important to know, however, that these numbers are simply an
estimate and they may change significantly based upon the outcome of the first year of
the realignment.
As of June, 2012, funding for the realignment plan had only been secured for that
year and not beyond. However, a more permanent allocation of funding for the
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realignment was instituted by Proposition 30 in November, 2012. The 2012-2013
California Budget Summary states that the “Governor is sponsoring an initiative to
provide Constitutional protection for the revenue dedicated to 2011 Realignment.
This initiative will also protect local governments against future costs imposed upon
them, as well as provide mandate protection for the state” (California Budget, 2012, p.
72). 1
The amount of state sales tax (1.0625 cents) dedicated to the realignment plan in
its first year was projected at $5.1 billion. The Governor diverted these funds from the
General fund to the 58 California counties in order to account for realignment expenses.
However, traditionally these funds have been dedicated to California’s education system,
causing an impact on funding for the state’s educational programs (Taylor, 2012). In
February, 2012, the California State Association of Counties (CSAC) announced that the
amount of VLF being diverted to the counties was approximately $462 million, up from
the previous estimate in the 2011-2012 budget. The additional revenue was allocated to
the Local Revenue Fund for future realignment expenditures (McIntosh, 2012).
It is important to understand the impact of how these trailer bills will affect the
funding for counties in California. The bullets below explain SB 89’s role in realignment
and its wide reaching impact (California City Finance, 2012):
• Eliminates VLF allocations to the County of Orange and cities after July 1, 2011,
and instead, transfers these amounts (around $190 million) together with the $300
million above to a new Local Law Enforcement Services Account to fund the law
enforcement grants.
• Imposes an increase in the Vehicle License Registration Fee of $12 to produce
1

Proposition 30 of 2012. It passed with 53.9% of the vote. (Rosenberg, 2012)
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approximately $300 million in FY 2011-12. This is a true fee for service that
funds state DMV vehicle license registration operations.
• Provides for DMV charges to the MVLF for administrative services, limited to $25
million in FY2011-12.
Further details of the funding in Figure 5 below depict the percentage of the state
sales tax that is diverted away from the state’s General Fund. On the left is an estimate of
the revenue stream indicated in the state’s budget for 2011-2012. The right shows the
current projection of the sales and uses tax for the state. Due to the reallocation of $5.1
billion for the backing of the realignment plan, other state programs that rely on this
revenue stream for funding, such as the education system, may face significant spending
cuts in the upcoming budget for the new fiscal year (California Budget, 2011).
Figure 5: Sales and Use Taxes.

Source: California Budget, 2011
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According to AB 109 and its trailer bills, the realignment plan estimates that in
2013, the revenue total from the VLF should be upward of $1 billion (CDCR, 2012).
Law enforcement officials stressed that the state would permanently pay counties any
extra costs to house prisoners who would normally be sent to state prisons (Song &
Goldmacher, 2011). Counties want to make sure that they will not incur any financial
losses. While the implementation of AB 118 and SB 89 will provide initial funding for
the realignment, the long-term costs must be addressed. Some counties, such as Merced,
have requested a state constitutional amendment that would guarantee funding for
realignment (Song & Goldmacher, 2011).
Parole and Probation and How This Helps Overcrowding
California has significant budget shortfalls projected for the future, meaning that
more effective management of convicted criminals and a concomitant reduction in prison
system inmates is essential if the budget is to be balanced. This requires not only the
realignment of incarceration for specified criminals under AB 109, but also effective
transition reentry programs for inmates (Tonry, 1999). “Many prisoners can indeed be
released without any threat to public safety. What caused this overcrowding in the first
place were the draconian sentencing laws that now unnecessarily keep huge numbers of
entirely non-violent inmates behind bars, for smoking dope or writing bad checks, or for
missing parole appointments” (The Economist, 2011). Funding has increased for
imprisonment but not for rehabilitation. According to the Department of Justice, fewer
programs and lack of incentives to participate mean fewer inmates leave prison having
addressed their work, education, and substance abuse problems (Petersilia, 2000).
The recidivism rate will rise if rehabilitative opportunities are not funded and
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implemented through a comprehensive inmate transition assistance program. Transition
services provide a crucial link to immediate sources of help to address these issues,
focusing on providing continuity of care so that inmates who received services continue
to get them once they leave (CDCR, 2011). The fewer services and assistance programs
there are for parolees and other released prisoners returning to communities, the more
likely it is that recidivism rates will climb (Petersilia, 2000).
The key to ending high recidivism rates is to develop public support to ensure that
released prisoners get the help they need to deter them from re-offending. Forms of
sentencing other than probation, prison, or a combination of the two (split sentences) are
widely used in virtually every state (McCray, 2012). A few of these alternate forms of
sentencing are described in the table below.
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Table B: Alternate Sentencing Sanctions.
Work	
  release	
  and	
  weekend	
  sentencing	
  

Shock	
  Incarceration	
  
Pre-‐Trial	
  Release	
  Programs	
  

Day	
  Reporting	
  Centers	
  

Electronic	
  Monitoring-‐GPS/	
  House	
  Arrest	
  

Treatment/	
  Rehabilitative	
  Programs	
  

Source: A. McCray, 2012

The	
  inmate	
  works	
  at	
  a	
  regular	
  job	
  
during	
  the	
  day	
  but	
  returns	
  to	
  a	
  secure	
  
facility	
  every	
  night	
  and	
  weekend	
  to	
  
serve	
  a	
  specified	
  sentence.	
  
A	
  short-‐term	
  	
  (one	
  to	
  ten	
  days)	
  period	
  
of	
  custody	
  as	
  a	
  sanction	
  for	
  those	
  on	
  
post-‐release	
  community	
  supervision	
  
Is	
  an	
  important	
  tool	
  in	
  reducing	
  jail	
  
population	
  because	
  a	
  significant	
  
number	
  of	
  California’s	
  jail	
  inmates	
  are	
  
awaiting	
  trial.	
  Upon	
  release,	
  offenders	
  
must	
  continue	
  to	
  report	
  to	
  the	
  court	
  to	
  
maintain	
  presence	
  in	
  the	
  community	
  
while	
  awaiting	
  trial.	
  	
  
Are	
  intermediate	
  sanctions	
  that	
  
require	
  offenders	
  to	
  be	
  supervised	
  by	
  a	
  
probation	
  officer	
  and	
  assigned	
  to	
  a	
  
facility	
  where	
  offenders	
  will	
  report	
  on	
  
a	
  daily	
  or	
  other	
  regular	
  basis	
  at	
  
specified	
  times	
  for	
  a	
  specified	
  length	
  of	
  
time	
  to	
  participate	
  in	
  activities	
  such	
  as	
  
counseling,	
  treatment,	
  social	
  skill	
  
training,	
  or	
  employment	
  training.	
  
GPS-‐	
  Inmates	
  being	
  held	
  in	
  lieu	
  of	
  bail	
  
in	
  a	
  county	
  jail	
  or	
  other	
  county	
  
correctional	
  facility	
  may	
  participate	
  in	
  
an	
  electronic	
  monitoring	
  program.	
  
House	
  Arrest-‐	
  If	
  offender	
  has	
  
significant	
  community	
  ties	
  to	
  family,	
  
friends,	
  employers,	
  and	
  community	
  
groups.	
  
Programs	
  that	
  assist	
  in	
  educational	
  
and	
  vocational	
  support,	
  employment	
  
attainment,	
  housing	
  opportunities,	
  and	
  
counseling.	
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Some possibilities of alternative sentencing for criminal offenders are work
release and weekend sentencing, shock incarceration, community service programs, day
fines, day reporting centers, house arrest and electronic monitoring, residential
community corrections, and diversionary treatment programs. Other types of alternative
sentencing options, such as mediation and restitution, are sometimes available (Evans,
2009). Some officials consider parolees to have a better chance to be rehabilitated under
supervision since they can be provided with drug treatment and programs offered by
faith-based and community groups (Song & Goldmacher, 2011).
AB 109 added section 17.5 to the California Penal Code, which states that
California must reinvest its criminal justice resources to support community-based
corrections programs and evidence-based practices that will achieve improved public
safety returns (Hopper, 2012). This element of AB 109 represents a change from the long
history of draconian sentencing and “incarceration first” tactics to an alternate,
community-centered approach. Under AB 109’s realignment, alternative sentencing
offers a better chance for low-level offenders to become productive members of society.
Whether it is through county based treatment centers, support through community
groups, or work release programs, offenders now have choices to get the help they need
to rehabilitate and change their lives through more personal and attentive programs
available at the county level and through probation.
Probation Subsidy Act of 1965
In the 1960s, there was a strong push for alternative sentencing guidelines. In
1965, then-Governor Pat Brown signed into a law a sweeping prison reform bill called
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the Probation Subsidy Act. This act is similar to AB 109. Both measures funded the
counties to keep low-level offenders in their custody rather than send them to state
prison. The goal of the Probation Subsidy Act was to limit prison overcrowding at the
state level. Today, AB 109 is attempting to accomplish the same feat, albeit with the hope
of a little more success than its predecessor (Kuehn, 1972). The Probation Subsidy Act
believed that “harmless offenders could be left in the community and successfully treated
with little or no threat to public safety” (Rushford, 2012, p. 2). In the first few years of
the program’s existence, California believed it was a success. The number of inmates
heading to state prisons went down and there was little prison overcrowding. However,
according to a report by the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, while the state inmate
population decreased, the crime rate rose significantly. “In the five years preceding the
implementation of probation subsidy (1960-1965), violent crime rose by 18% or roughly
3.6% per year. In the five years after its implementation (1966-1970), violent crime had
increased by 68% or 13.6% per year. By 1980, violent crime had risen by 216% and the
homicide rate had increased by 300%” (Rushford, 2012, p. 2).
Research on the costs and benefits of the Probation Subsidy Act of 1965 show
that, while the state saved money by decreasing the number of inmates in their state
prisons, those costs were offset by the dramatic increase in recidivism rates for those
inmates that were transferred to county jails or released early. These findings suggest that
the long-term success of AB 109’s new parole versus probation programs must be closely
observed.
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Methodology: Process Evaluation - AB 109
The methodology for this research was a process evaluation of Assembly Bill
(AB) 109 and its trailer bills, including an overview of the finances and effectiveness of
California’s adopted prisoner realignment plan. News periodicals and data available
through the CDRC as well as other government websites were compiled. The focus of the
evaluation is on how the requirements of AB 109 were implemented in the first six
months, starting with the first prisoner realignment in October of 2011. Process
evaluation considers problems, potential solutions, the implementation of those solutions,
and whether that implementation complies with the mandate. In this case, the SCOTUS
decision required the state to comply with the timeline for reducing California’s prison
overcrowding by 44,000 prisoners by June 2013.
The research focused on data for the first six months of implementation from
selected California counties, focusing on whether AB 109 is the best possible solution to
reduce overcrowding and meet the guidelines specified in the SCOTUS mandate, given
the state’s severe budgetary limitations and the short timeline imposed by the Supreme
Court. Since the prisoner realignment program and overcrowding reduction will not be
completed until June 2013, the evaluation of AB 109 shows: 1) how the process of
realignment is working; 2) the reduction of prison population in state facilities; 3) the rise
of population in county jails; and 4) the capability of county jails to absorb the new
prisoner stream and whether the sales tax and VLF-based funding for the county jail
expenses adequately reimburse the actual expenses of county jails through May 2012.
Additionally, data indicated how the counties’ allocated funding was useful in projecting
the success of the new policy.
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The process evaluation has necessitated extensive research of recent statistics and
data to draw conclusions regarding AB 109’s progress toward the court-mandated
solution. However, while prisoner realignment may initially lead to a reduction in state
prison overcrowding to court-mandated levels, if other factors such as crime rates and
recidivism increase, it could prove that AB 109 was ultimately ineffective.
The table below shows the four steps in process evaluation for California’s
solution to prison overcrowding. It evaluated whether the solution aligned with the
legislative intent of resolving the problem, whether the implementation of the solution
aligned with the legislative intent of the solution, and whether other measures might
increase the success of the solution to the problem.
Table C: Process Evaluation of AB 109.
Problem:	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  mandate	
  to	
  
reduce	
  prison	
  population	
  due	
  to	
  
inadequate	
  health	
  and	
  mental	
  health	
  
care	
  caused	
  by	
  overcrowding	
  
Solution:	
  	
  Transfer	
  state	
  inmates	
  to	
  
county	
  jails	
  to	
  reduce	
  overcrowding	
  and	
  
state	
  spending.	
  Change	
  parole	
  to	
  
probation	
  for	
  selected	
  inmates	
  

Implementation:	
  	
  A.	
  Assessment	
  of	
  
counties’	
  data	
  provided	
  to	
  the	
  state.	
  	
  	
  
B.	
  Probation/	
  not	
  parole	
  statistics	
  –	
  
alternative	
  sentencing	
  reform	
  
C.	
  Evaluate	
  effectiveness	
  of	
  AB	
  109	
  for	
  
first	
  six	
  months	
  
Recommendation:	
  	
  Continue	
  AB	
  109,	
  
apply	
  alternate	
  sentencing	
  options,	
  
reform	
  realignment	
  process	
  (Prop	
  30),	
  
or	
  other	
  options.	
  Secure	
  funding,	
  an	
  
oversight	
  tool	
  

Source of Data: CDCR, 2011
This process evaluation was conducted over the first six months of this new
alignment plan in order to track its progress toward meeting the legislative intent of AB
109, which was to comply with the SCOTUS mandate. This research included an
analysis of the counties to determine which jails had capacity, and whether offenders
were moved around the state to available spaces to avoid jail overcrowding.
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CDCR archives provided current statistics regarding the recently implemented
directives, which led to development of an evaluation of how AB 109 and its trailer bills
have supported the reduction of overcrowding in California prisons. This included costs,
funding, and realignment initiatives. This data led to producing realistic projections of
the AB 109 program outcome and assessment of any problems that have hindered prison
reform and realignment in its first six months.

Findings
SCOTUS issued a federal mandate to reduce the state’s prison population to ease
overcrowding, creating a problem for the CDCR. California responded with AB 109 to
serve as a new governing policy that would direct the realignment of state prisoners to
county jails. To evaluate whether the realignment process is currently working, a sample
of five similar counties was examined to collect and analyze relevant data that may
indicate success or failure. The time period analyzed was from the implementation of AB
109 in October 2011 until April 2012. The collected data has been put into a table below
that depicts the progress and the varying issues of AB 109. By selecting a diverse sample
of counties, the differences in approach are evident as a result of there being no stateimposed standard.
For the program’s first six month period, the table displays data regarding how
many inmates have been deferred to the county jails, how much funding each county
received, and whether the county chose to manage AB 109 through rehabilitation or jail
expansion. For example, due to a higher than expected number of prisoners diverted to
San Bernardino County jails, the county estimates that over 4,000 prisoners – non-
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serious, non-violent, non-sexual offenders – will be released from jails within the first
year of AB 109 due to county overcrowding (Misczynski, 2011).
Early data collection suggests that the state has underestimated the number of
prisoners that counties will receive through diversion of the “three nons” from the state
prisons to county jails. Thus overcrowding is likely to be experienced in the jails unless
jail expansion is undertaken, or pre-trial supervision is diverted to non-jail systems and
alternative sentencing programs are more aggressively used for appropriate offenders.
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Amount
of Sales
Tax and
VLF
10/114/12

Vacant
Beds
in
Sept.
2011

Number
of
Prisoners
Estimated
by State

$9.2
Million

300+

267

$4.5
Million

190+

104

$12.6
Million

Amount
Allocated
to New
Beds

Amount
Spent on
Probation/
Rehab.
Programs

Total
Funding
Requested
For Jail
Expansion
10/11-5/12

$0

$4.7
Million

$0

420
$1.4
70 Avg.
Million
Per Month

$2.1
Million

$0

1,000+ 693

1,338*
$5
223 Avg. Million
Per Month

$8.6
Million

$0

$2.9
Million

80+

168*
$2
28 Avg.
Million
Per Month

$600,000

$23.1
Million

1,260+ 1,464

$35
Million
*Pending
Jail
Construction
AB 900
$100
Million
*Pending
Jail
Construction
AB 900

321

Number
of
Prisoners
Received/
Projected
in First
Six
Months
282*
47 Avg.
Per Month

Orange

Kings

Santa Clara

Contra Costa

Alameda

County Name

First-Months of Implementation
Table D: AB 109 County Sampling Statistics.

1,752*
$Unknown $8.8
292 Avg. Cost for
Million
Per Month 750 New
Beds

* Data is a six month projection using first month’s data and multiplying by six.
Sources of Data: County Implementation Plans (October, 2011) ACLU (November,
2011).
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The data accumulated in Table D is derived from the ACLU report published in
March 2012 and individual county implementation plans, which were available through
the Internet. The counties that the author looked at to gather data comparisons and trends
were Alameda, Contra Costa, Santa Clara, Kings and Orange. Each county was selected
for further study due to the disparate amount of beds, funding, and inmate population. Of
the five selected counties, only Alameda County received fewer “three-nons” prisoners
than it had vacant beds. Kings, Contra Costa, Santa Clara and Orange County exceeded
the expected inmate projection set by the state, which in turn exceeded the available
empty beds. A county-by-county breakdown follows.
Alameda County
Alameda County was allocated $9.2 million for AB 109 funding in October 2011.
The month prior to the implementation of AB 109, there were 300 unused beds in their
county jail system. After the first six months of implementation of AB 109, Alameda
County saw a steady rise of inmates. The total projected number of inmates of 282 was
close to the state anticipated amount of 267. This positive correlation shows that Alameda
County does not need to expand its jail facilities. Instead, Alameda County’s AB 109
implementation plan called for $4.7 million in funding to be used for rehabilitative
purposes.
Contra Costa County
Contra Costa County was allocated $4.5 million for the funding of AB 109. In
September 2011, Contra Costa had approximately 190 beds available for the state
anticipated amount of 104 inmates over the first six months of AB 109 implementation.
Contra Costa received nearly four times (420 inmates) the state’s projected amount and
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averaged roughly 70 inmates per month. This did not lead to a need for overall jail
expansion. Instead, the steady increase of inmates led Contra Costa to use $1.4 million of
the allotted funding on the procurement of more beds to accommodate the rising number
of inmates being sent to their county jails. According to their county implantation plan,
Contra Costa also expected to allocate $2.1 million of AB 109 funding toward
rehabilitation programs.
Santa Clara County
Santa Clara County was allotted $12.6 million in funding for AB 109. With
approximately 1,000 beds available for realignment, the state expected to send 693
inmates over the span of the first six months. As shown in Table D, the projection of
inmates to be sent during this time was 1,338, or 223 per month, exceeding the total
number of available beds. In order to comply with AB 109 and ease overcrowding, Santa
Clara expected to use $5 million of funding towards adding beds within their county jails,
as well as spending $8.6 million on rehabilitative programs. According to Santa Clara
County’s AB 109 implementation plan, they do not intend to use funding towards jail
expansion.
Kings County
Kings County was allotted $2.9 million in funding for AB 109 in October 2011.
The state projected nearly 321 inmates to be sent to Kings County over the first six
months. However, Kings County only had room for approximately 80 inmates in their
jails at the time of implementation, therefore jail expansion was deemed necessary. Kings
County provided $2 million in funding for additional beds and also applied for $35
million in emergency AB 900 funds for new jail construction. According to the above
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data, Kings County only received 168 inmates over the six month timeline, well below
the anticipated 321. Those numbers averaged out to an additional 28 inmates per month.
The county implementation plan calls for jail expansion in the long term in order to be in
compliance with AB 109 for years to come.
Orange County
Orange County was allotted $23.1 million in funding for AB 109. Over the first
six months of implementation, Orange County had been the most affected of the five
counties. Orange County had nearly 1,260 beds available for the state anticipated amount
of 1,464 inmates over the first six months of AB 109 implementation. According to the
Orange County AB 109 implementation plan, the county was aware that it would need to
apply for $100 million AB 900 jail expansion funding in order to meet the demand. As
shown in Table D, Orange County would receive a projected amount of 1,752 inmates,
roughly 300 more than the state had anticipated. With an unknown amount of funding
needed for approximately 750 new beds, Orange County provided $8.8 million of AB
109 funding towards rehabilitation programs in an attempt to mitigate inmate
overcrowding.
Six Months Later
The author conducted research on the first six months of realignment to determine
if there was a significant relationship between the total number of inmates before and
after the implementation of AB 109. In September 2011, the California prison population
stood at nearly 144,000 inmates (CDCR, 2011); six months later, the California prison
system held a population of nearly 127,000 inmates, a reduction of nearly 17,000 state
inmates (Stanton, 2012). This data showed that within the first six months of
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implementation the state prison system had decreased its total population size by nearly
12%.
Inmate Diversion Findings
In addition to the previously mentioned counties, the author conducted research
on a small sample size of counties to understand whether they would favor rehabilitation
or jail expansion. The counties studied were San Mateo, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San
Bernardino, and Kings County. In order to determine the relationship, the author
correlated the total amount of funding allocated per county to the method each county
used to implement the AB 109 process.
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Table E: Inmate Diversion Fiscal Year 2011-2012.
#Inmates/
Probationers
Expected
208 Inmates
351 Probationers

Amount of
Funding
Received
$4,222,902

Rehabilitation or
Jail Expansion

Overall Impact of AB 109
Per County

Rehabilitative
programs using
multidisciplinary
teams for reentry

San
Francisco

164 Inmates
421 Probationers

$5,049,838

Los
Angeles

8342 Inmates
9791 Probationers

$112,558,273

San
Bernardino

2301 Inmates
2521 Probationers

$25,785,600

Kings
County

321 Inmates
185 Probationers

$2,862,035

Focuses on
rehabilitative
programs to
reduce
recidivism, not
increase
incarceration
Utilize funds for
both and to hire
103 additional
probation
officers
Currently uses
rehab measures
but is pushing
for jail
expansion
Plans to spend
70% of funding
towards jail
expansion

One of the leaders of
successful implementation
of AB 109; using own tax
dollars to fund a previously
planned new jail
AB109 does not fund the
offender population, and
fiscally penalizes the county
for having strong
rehabilitative programs

San Mateo

Implementing an evidence
based supervision model to
limit recidivism (SB 678)
Expect over 4,000 prisoners
released from jails in first
year due to overcrowding,
creating a safety concern for
community
An increased effort to
incarcerate rather than to
help ease overcrowding

Source of Data: California Realignment Organization, April, 2012.
In reference to Table F in the Analysis section, the data shows a correlation
between counties that have established rehabilitation programs as opposed to those that
have chosen to incarcerate.
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Analysis
The Analysis portion of this process evaluation has been exercised with the
principal goal of determining whether or not AB 109 has operated efficiently and
appropriately (Sylvia and Sylvia, 2004). The researcher applied the previously described
four-phase research process of evaluation as detailed within the Methodology to acquire
the Findings, which have been synthesized into multiple detailed “significant
observations” within this Analysis. This Analysis contained a “process approach that
involved collecting and assessing the data to determine whether the solutions to the
problem were implemented as intended and produced the desired effects” (Sylvia and
Sylvia, p. 91, 2004). The significant observations each incorporate an analysis that helps
to determine whether or not AB 109 has been successful or if it thus far has failed to
achieve its intended outcome.
The budget crisis in California is real and pervasive. Constitutional limitations
growing out of the historic Proposition 13 have limited the ability of the legislature and
local governments to raise taxes or fees to pay for increasing costs of services. AB 109
was proposed to solve a state-level problem of prison overcrowding, but it may be
creating another state level problem of financial inadequacy. The cost-benefit analysis of
the AB 109 realignment seems to lack a thorough analysis of all associated costs,
including the lost opportunity costs associated with the reallocation of the state’s scarce
General Fund expenditures. Specifically, the legislative analysis of AB 109 lacks the
following details in its public records: the cost per inmate in CDCR, the cost per inmate
in county jails, the savings per inmate under AB 109, and the cost for parole versus the
cost for probation.
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Lack of a thorough public analysis of this realignment leaves the state unable to
evaluate the success of the strategy and whether it should be retained. The trade-offs
inherent in the realignment and its funding mechanisms have an initial impact on nonsafety programs and transportation system conditions, because more VLF money spent
on prisons means less money for road repairs and city services. More broadly,
California’s economic downturn is forced reductions in police and fire service levels.
This jeopardizes the financial interests of the counties by increasing risks to community
safety. In addition, the Legislative Analyst’s Office postulates that the diverted sales tax
revenues will come from allocations for education. However, while the diversion of
prisoners from state custody also represents a savings of costs to the CDCR, the funding
for the realignment does not clearly come from a reduction in CDCR budgeted expenses.
Significant Observation 1: While AB 109 shifted funding and responsibility away from
the state to the county level, the number of inmates statewide has not changed; the
prisons are less overcrowded, but the county jails are filled nearly to capacity. Also,
while funds to pay for AB 109 have been diverted from VLF, education, and state safety
budgets, the fallout from this accounting strategy is only beginning to be felt at local
levels.
In order to determine whether AB 109 is currently working, a sample size of five
counties was examined to collect and analyze relevant data that may indicate the
implementation’s effectiveness. A six month time frame was used in order to observe
new data regarding AB 109’s possible development. By selecting a diverse sample of
counties, the differences in approach evinced a lack of state-imposed standard.
The six month analysis presented in Table D showed that there are simply not
enough beds, room, or adequate funding to house these additional inmates. Shifting the
burden of overcrowding from the state level to the county level is a failed outcome. AB
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109 needs to be able to manage the reduction of state prisoners without putting the safety
of the community at risk by releasing inmates early due to county jail overcrowding.
Current estimates provided by AB109 and its trailer bills projected that the state
of California would have its prison population reduced by approximately 20,000 inmates
by the beginning of 2012. Upon full implementation of the mandated policy, the CDRC
is currently projecting cutting one-fourth (40,000 inmates) of its total inmate population
by 2014-2015 (Taylor, 2011). Such prisoner shifts and financial trade-offs need to be
evaluated to determine whether the process of managing the program and funding the
program is meeting the intended outcome of lowering prison overcrowding in a revenue
neutral way. Public safety also needs to be carefully analyzed to assess the steady flow of
inmates that are released back into California communities.
Furthermore, jail expansion provides a flawed method for counties to handle
realignment. This concept does not address overpopulating county jails until they too
become victims of overcrowding. It is necessary for the state to clearly define its
objective and its funding responsibilities for realignment purposes. The six month
window to evaluate AB 109 has demonstrated the need to conduct a proper time series
analysis of AB 109 implementation.
The lack of a standardized reporting system among counties and lack of AB 109
implementation oversight from the state created difficulty in collecting accurate and
timely data from county to county. Allowing the counties to use the funding without
consistent oversight measures impaired the state’s ability to evaluate the implementation
process. Table E above shows disparities in the amount funded per county and how each
sampled county intends to use it. It shows that the state fiscally penalizes counties for
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having strong rehabilitative programs, thus reducing the number of inmates historically
sent to state prisons, and provides larger amounts of funding for those counties with
higher incarceration rates.
If the proposed realignment plan does not provide enough revenue to support the
mandated diversion of prisoners into the jail system, the legislature will have to allocate
more funds by cutting programs or rearranging legislative priorities. If for some reason
the state revenues to support AB 109 exceed their expectations, then proper oversight
would be beneficial to determine how to reallocate the excess revenue (Taylor, 2011).
Significant Observation 2: The state has failed to create a data collection tool to
develop evidence for an outcome evaluation. Data collection is imperative and should be
required as part of the counties’ agreement to receive funds for AB 109 implementation.
The state has an interest in the short term to know whether the desired outcomes
of lowered overall incarceration rates and lowered recidivism have been achieved
through the implementation of AB 109. The difficulty in collecting consistent data from
the counties sampled demonstrates the lack of a state data tracking system, making an
outcome analysis difficult. The state needs to collect, to monitor, and to analyze all fiftyeight counties’ data to determine which individual county-run programs and policies are
the most effective for reducing recidivism, the only long-term solution to prison
overcrowding. Such a tool must be developed and required as part of a mutual agreement
between the state and counties to revise the method for the proper funding of AB 109
implementation. AB 109 provides for “a data-driven approach to reduce corrections and
related criminal justice spending and reinvest savings in strategies designed to increase
public safety” (McCray, 2012, p. 44). Fatal flaws may arise in this new realignment
program if state officials neglect to require counties to report outcomes, or if they fail to

California Realignment: Assembly Bill (AB) 109

40

fund methods to evaluate AB 109. With no evaluation mandate, the state lacks statistics
regarding the outcomes of implemented programs and services to reduce recidivism rates,
as well as progress in released offender and community relationships. Despite this lack of
oversight, 76% of the 58 counties have offered to plan and collect data independently to
try to measure their outcomes of the implementation of realignment (McCray, 2012).
Data from the AB 109 implementation might demonstrate the fallacy in
California’s tendency to incarcerate, and compel officials to search for more proactive
alternative sentencing strategies. A potential result could be to drop recidivism rates and
lower populations in state prisons and in county jails. Some counties, like San Mateo, San
Francisco, and Santa Clara, have focused on alternatives to incarceration, and could be
counties to emulate for managing low-level offenders (Gabrielson, 2012). Their emphasis
on rehabilitative programs, if proven successful, could be one solution of many to help
modify the state’s reliance on incarceration.
Significant Observation 3: The current system allocates state inmates without
concern for whether or not a county can house them or afford them, which in turn, causes
overcrowding and early release at the county level. The current economic climate makes
the construction of county jails a questionable investment; however, rehabilitative
programs and community outreach programs for the “three-nons” may help reduce
county inmate populations and costs.
As of June 27, 2012, the AB 109 realignment process appeared to be proceeding
as planned. The state had met its previous two mandated prisoner population benchmarks
set by SCOTUS. In the first six months of realignment, the prison population dropped to
approximately 127,000, a decrease of nearly 17,000 inmates (Stanton, 2012). However, it
is important to note that county jails have had to absorb the new “three-nons” prisoners to
make this reduction possible (Rushford, 2012).

California Realignment: Assembly Bill (AB) 109

41

According to county jail officials, the realignment plan has benefitted the state
prisons but has created problems for county jails. After the first six months of
implementation, some counties were already expressing concern over the lack of funding
and staff to accommodate such a dramatic overhaul of California’s prison system (LugtuShaddox, 2012). Some officials estimated that, since realignment began in October 2011,
their jails lacked the capacity to hold the number of felons in the “three-nons” category,
creating an overcrowding issue for the county jails and forcing the early release of
inmates back into the California communities (Lugtu-Shaddox, 2012). California
counties are being allotted a higher number of inmates than originally calculated by the
CDCR. For example, “'Merced County has seen about 30 percent more offenders than the
CDCR estimated, said Scott Ball, the county’s chief probation officer. They expected 73
inmates but got 116 during the first four months of realignment” (Perez, 2012, p. 1).
Situations like this are forcing counties to choose between the costs of “increasing jail
space or releasing some criminals assessed to be at ‘high risk’ of re-offending”
(Rushford, 2012, p. 9). In a recent report by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
most, if not all, counties are using their AB 109 funding for jail expansions or increasing
the number of beds per unit in existing buildings.
Based upon reviews of the county realignment implementation plans conducted
by the ACLU, “approximately $45.1 million in realignment funding provided to the top
25 counties has already been allocated for jail capacity expansion costs, including 7,002
new jail beds and 722 new corrections-related staff” (Hopper, 2012, p. 15). Since there
was no oversight directed from the state to the county level to control spending, the
counties were able to create their own individual plans that would either support or
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advocate against incarceration. For example, “(While) San Mateo County expects to add
500 more beds, San Francisco intends to reopen a previously closed jail, which would
produce 360 additional beds, and Alameda County has ruled out jail expansion
altogether” (Hopper, 2012, p. 16).
Some analysts suggest that if the counties intend to use their AB 109 funding for
jail expansion and not offender treatment programs, their jails will encounter similar
overcrowding problems. In fact, in the first six months of the realignment program, the
top 25 California counties that were apportioned roughly 92% of the total state allocation,
“have either designated realignment dollars for jail capacity expansion or hope to tap into
separate state funds earmarked for jail construction through AB 900 or both” (Hopper,
2012, p. 16). As shown in Table D, jail bed space expansion is a popular concept, which
most counties have chosen to use to comply with the new realignment plan. Some
counties, such as Kings and Orange, have petitioned the AB 900 fund for jail construction
money, while others are adding beds to existing facilities. This methodology focuses on
incarceration rather than creating solutions to reduce recidivism.
A few counties’ decisions to focus on alternative sentencing and community-based
services, instead of relying on jail expansion, have provided a cheaper and safer route to
realignment. Since the state did not dictate how the funding for realignment was to be
used, individual counties are choosing to allocate their funds based on local perceptions
of need, resulting in inconsistency in how California’s county jails are managing
realignment. For example, San Francisco and Sacramento Counties have proposed the
idea of reopening previously closed jails to reduce the burden of overcrowding within
their respective counties. However, opening jails could result in significant increases in
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the cost of realignment for the counties. In Sacramento County, reopening the jail would
cost $700,000 per month to manage and maintain it effectively (Hopper, 2012). Los
Angeles, San Mateo, and King Counties are building new jails, while Santa Clara and
Alameda Counties are using the funding to acquire additional beds and fully implement
treatment and rehabilitation programs to reduce incarceration rates and recidivism.
Alameda County is, in fact, the only one in the top 25 counties that has not included jail
bed expansion in its AB 109 implementation plan (Hopper, 2012). According to Santa
Clara County’s AB 109 implementation plan, it would cost the county nearly $20,000 to
house one inmate for a year. So, instead of incarceration, Santa Clara County has chosen
to rehabilitate to cut costs and reduce recidivism.
Counties are feeling the pressure of managing the realignment plan. According to the
Bay City News, “Since realignment took effect October 1st, 2011, Contra Costa County
jails have taken in 420 additional non-violent, non-sexual, non-serious inmates – a
staggering 500 percent above the state’s early projections” (Bay City News, 2012, p. 1).
Undersheriff Mike Casten stated, in order to cover the cost of these additional inmates,
the funding for the counties needs to change. Contra Costa was only allocated
approximately $6 million (Cheever, 2012). Casten predicts that his county’s funding
would need to double this year in order to comply with the realignment plan. Without the
funding, inmates will have to be released into the community to prevent jail
overcrowding.
California counties have been hit hard by the realignment plan, receiving far more
prisoners than the state estimated. In fact, the data in Table D depicts a growing trend
toward overcrowding that will not only be a state issue but a county level problem as
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well. Once empty beds are now filling up at an alarming rate. The data projects the
counties’ ability to sustain adequate facilities for the new flow of inmates for a short
period of time before they too are overcrowded and are forced to resort to alternatives
such as early release. Some counties, such as Riverside and San Bernardino, have already
initiated that trend by releasing hundreds of inmates back into society. Furthermore, in
the early phases of realignment, many counties have exceeded their predicted inmate
projections. For example, Orange County, Contra Costa County, and Santa Clara County
will have received the state’s estimated 12 month total of new inmates in the first six
months alone. According to Rodney Jones, the Chief of Police of Fontana, “When
someone is released early under realignment, an opportunity exists to break a vicious
cycle of recidivism. As a society, we incarcerate individuals who cannot abide by the
rules in close proximity with other individuals already incarcerated for not following
those same rules. No one should be surprised that they re-offend when they are released”
(Fontana, CA, Chamber of Commerce, 2012 p. 1).

In smaller counties, such as Trinity, the effect of realignment has also been
significant. The state had informed Trinity County that they would only expect to see an
additional inmate or parolee a month in accordance with the new realignment plan.
However, since January, Trinity County has received seventeen additional inmates. This
has caused the county to hire five more probation officers and staff. Chief Probation
Officer Terry Lee, while supporting AB 109 in principle, believes that the state needs to
double the funding starting this November (Morris, 2012). He is concerned that
inadequate funding for jail costs could cause early release of prisoners, and inadequate
funding for probation supervision could lead to higher crime rates in the community.
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A key issue Mr. Lee highlights regarding the “three-nons” is that the classification
arises from the inmate’s last arresting crime. The state is not using prior convictions in
order to determine if they are indeed low-level offenders (Morris, 2012). Therefore some
of the “three-nons” prisoners may actually have a history of violent or other serious
crimes or sexually related crimes, meaning that early release back into the community
could pose public safety problems. The bottom line is that the evaluation of prisoners for
participation in the “three-nons” category should be modified to take into account the
individual's total criminal history, not just the most recent offense, and those with other
than “three-nons” convictions previously should still go to state prison.

Significant Observation 4: AB 109’s funding allocation formula financially rewarded
counties that historically sent more “three-nons” inmates to prison instead of
rehabilitative centers, which reflects the savings to the state of diverting those prisoners
to the county jails. However, this approach contradicts the goal of AB 109 to reduce the
incarcerated population overall.
AB 109's realignment program should be supported based on the cost to house or
rehabilitate the individual prisoner rather than on past practices of incarceration
sentences, which led to overcrowding in the first place. Instead, the funding formula was
created from the state’s perspective rather than being based on the costs that county jails
would experience from the realignment. Table E depicts how a handful of the counties
intend to spend their allocated resources in order to meet their individual county needs.
To date, a majority of counties have expressed the desire to use the funding on more
beds, jail expansion, or reopening closed jails instead of funding treatment services to
help close the revolving door of recidivism.
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Since the state’s goal was to lower its prison population, the formula included
funding related to the number of “three-nons” prisoners sent to state prisons from that
county. The rationale was that this was the cost avoided by the state (Gabrielson, 2012).
This creates disparities in per capita funding for prisoners being received in county jails,
since some counties have used community-based programs rather than prison as
punishment. For example, San Francisco, Alameda and Contra Costa counties feel that
the state of California has actually penalized them for having introduced alternatives to
incarceration, such as medical treatment, work-release programs, and home detention
(Cheever, 2012). These large population counties received considerably less AB 109
funding per capita than other smaller counties due to their modest number of low-level
offenders sent to state prisons. A prime example, shown in Table F below, is the
difference in funding given to the “rehabilitative” Alameda County over San Bernardino
County that employs high incarceration rates. The allocation of funds seems to indicate
that the state would rather see the counties incarcerate more inmates than develop
rehabilitation and community-based initiatives.

Table F: AB 109 Funding Comparison: Alameda County and San Bernardino County.

County
Population
Alameda
1.6 million
San Bernardino
2 million
Source of Data: J. Cheever, 2012.

Crime Rate
2.8%
2.2%

Funding
$ 9.2 million
$ 25.8 million

Significant Observation 5: Newly proposed legislation recognizes the importance of
incorporating rehabilitation into the AB 109 process.
California has recognized that flexible alternatives need to exist so the state can
more effectively reduce overcrowding and lower recidivism. AB 109 was a huge effort to
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regain control of its prison-crowding crisis. Six months into this new reform bill the
outcome is teetering between success and failure. The flexibility mentioned added a
change not only in policy but also in the state’s sentencing guidelines. State policies have
focused on determinate sentencing, crowding prisons with drug users, when prisoners
have an opportunity to be rehabilitated through county programs and treatment centers.
On February 24, 2012, California State Senator Mark Leno introduced SB 1506
that would have revised the sentencing parameters of one of the state’s highest
convictions: personal drug possession. Instead of being charged with a felony and a
mandated three-year prison term, the proposed bill labels it as a misdemeanor charge with
one year in a county jail. The recommended plan would have been beneficial to
California if it had passed. According to the ACLU report, it would have not only eased
overcrowding in state prisons and county jails, but have had a massive cost benefit as
well. “This single sentencing reform would save counties $159 million annually, in
addition to the $64.4 million in yearly savings for the state” (Gabrielson, 2012, p. 18). By
combining AB 109 and SB 1506, the state prisons and county jails would have been able
to limit overcrowding and apply the savings to alternative sentencing and treatment
programs. Recidivism rates were expected to steadily decline over the next few years
with this form of policy. However, in June 2012 only eleven state senators supported the
bill and it failed. (Rivas, 2012)
While coordination has been lacking between the state and counties, the progress
of AB 109 has encouraged state officials to develop a new plan that aims to increase the
success of realignment, reduce spending costs, comply with the federal mandate, and
decrease recidivism. On April 23, 2012, the CDCR presented a plan called “The Future
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of California Corrections: A Blueprint to Save Billions of Dollars, End Federal
Oversight, and Improve the Prison System” (CDCR, 2012). This new strategy overall is
more efficient and has an objective to significantly improve CDCR operations (CDCR,
2012). “The plan would cut spending by billions of dollars, cancel some construction
projects, close one lockup and bring back 9,500 inmates housed in other states — all
while meeting court orders to reduce crowding and improve medical care” (Merigan,
2012, p. 1). To be more specific, the table below lists the goals and the projected
outcomes of this new plan.
Table G: The Future of California Corrections Plan.
Reduce CDCR’s annual budget by more than $1.5 billion upon full implementation,
including $160 million dollars in savings from closing the California Rehabilitation
Center.
Eliminate $4.1 billion in construction projects that are no longer needed because of
population reductions.
Eliminate $2.2 billion annually that would have been spent had realignment not been
implemented.
Return all out-of-state inmates to California by 2016 to bring back jobs and manage
offenders closer to home while saving millions in taxpayer dollars.
Satisfy the U.S. Supreme Court’s order to lower the state’s prison population.
Satisfy the federal courts that CDCR has achieved and maintained constitutional levels of
medical, mental health and dental care to avoid costly oversight.
Incorporate a standardized staffing formula to better manage staff levels and costs,
improve the classification system to provide proper inmate housing placement, and
reduce the reliance on costly high-security facilities.
Source of Data: CDCR, J. Callison, April 23, 2012.
Since this new plan has recently been implemented, a thorough analysis needs to
be conducted to determine if it will be successful, including meeting the federal mandates
timeline, dropping recidivism rates, and cutting spending. “If the new plan is successful,
prisons will fall to 7.5% of spending in the 2015-16 budget” (Merigan, 2012, p. 1). This
plan would reduce spending by nearly three percent from the current CDCR budget
expenses. Further studies will be needed on this new plan to assess its overall outcome.

California Realignment: Assembly Bill (AB) 109

49

Some critics of this new plan, however, are already sharing their opinion.
According to Emily Harris of Californians United for a Responsible Budget, which
opposes heavy prison spending, “It is not really a bold vision in any way, the state should
be paroling more inmates and easing criminal sentences, which would help lower the
prison population further” (Merigan, 2012, p. 2).
The state of California is at a crucial juncture. At best, the realignment of the
three-non offenders to the counties will help ease prison overcrowding, continue to
maintain public safety, and spend their allocated funds on programs that reduce
recidivism. At worst, the realignment plan will be perceived as a mistaken transfer of
authority from one superior jurisdiction (the state) to another (the counties). The counties
will use the same sentencing guidelines, overfilling jails and creating the need for jail
expansion. Recidivism rates will increase and AB 109 will be a disaster. In order for this
not to happen, the state of California needs to uphold the realignment process through
proper oversight and financial support (Gabrielson, 2012).
The newly proposed Future of California Corrections plan might be a positive
step in California correction reform to assist the effectiveness of realignment and the
state’s prison policy. Currently, nobody can predict the full impact AB 109 will have on
crime and recidivism until after a longer period of implementation. However, in order to
establish a baseline for California crime statistics, analysts can use the Attorney
General’s report for comparison analysis of trends in crime leading to incarceration. “In
the longer term, however, the realignment of inmate and parolee populations has the
potential to significantly reduce cost pressures on the state’s prison system, as well as
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achieve a large share of the state inmate population reduction ordered by the federal
court” (Taylor, 2011, p. 9).
Overall, the hope of this massive realignment implementation hinges upon
eliminating overcrowding, reducing the crime rate, and decreasing recidivism. Yet with a
new emphasis on probation and parole and more than 52,000 offenders being transferred
from state prisons to county jails over the next few years, it will be challenging to realize
lower crimes rates (CSA, 2012).
Lastly, in November of 2012, the people of California helped secure funding in
the state’s constitution for AB 109 by voting on Proposition 30. Not only will it help the
state of California to avoid future cuts to education, healthcare, public safety and other
programs, but also to guarantee the essential funding necessary for realignment to be
successful.
With AB 109 implementation assured for the foreseeable future, additional
research is essential to ensure that it is properly implemented to make the most effective
use of the scarce public funds allocated to the counties. How will the counties be
impacted? Will sentencing reform take over as the major contributor to reducing
overcrowding? If so, how far-reaching will it be? The state could incorporate an incentive
program in order to implement evidence-based public safety policies and practices. State
funding could then be allocated to the counties that are on track to lower recidivism rates
as well as promote cost-effective alternatives to incarceration (Hopper, 2012).
Significant Observation 6: New parole and probation measures must be implemented
successfully under AB 109 in order to stabilize the state prison population and guarantee
fiscal savings for the state budget.
One of the more effective plans included in AB 109 to reduce overcrowding in state
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prisons is the handling of parolees. Beginning on October 1, 2011, all parole revocations
will result in a return to county jails for a maximum of 180 days rather than being sent
back to a state prison (CDCR, 2011, p. 4). This is a positive method both to lessen the
sentences for non-violent offenders and to keep state prison populations lower. AB 109
is not designed for a massive release of prisoners into communities; rather, it designates
authority and jurisdiction to the counties for future low-level offenders.
In addition, particular offenders that are released from prison will now be
supervised in the community by county probation agencies rather than California’s state
parole agents. “When locally supervised offenders violate conditions of their supervision,
the courts, rather than the Board of Parole Hearings, will preside over revocation hearings
to determine if they should be revoked to county jail” (Taylor, 2011, p. 16). Under the
proposed realignment plan, California’s parolee population is anticipated to drop by
nearly 25,000 during the fiscal year of 2011-2012. By the 2014-2015 deadline, the
projected reduction is expected to be close to 77,000 parolees (Taylor, 2011). This
reduction reflects a state savings of about $453 million in 2011-12. By the completion of
the process, the state is assuming a savings of close to $1.5 billion in their budget
(Taylor, 2011).
The savings for the state are realized at the expense of the counties’ probation
officers, who will see the biggest impact from the realignment as their caseloads rise. In
addition, they will also have to anticipate a high risk and high maintenance population of
incoming probationers. Previously, only people with jail sentences of one year or less
were housed in county jails and probation officers oversaw only departing inmates and
those sentenced only to probation (McCray, 2012). Now people sentenced up to three
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years will be housed in county jails, meaning that more serious offenses have been
committed. Because of this, almost every county’s AB 109 implementation report
emphasized the need to hire and train more probation employees. Some counties, such as
Kern, have now armed their probation officers. This move demonstrates a strong
similarity to the status of the state’s parole agents (McCray, 2012).
In order for the probation department to be effective under the new realignment,
they need to ensure that their ratio of caseload per officer is reasonable. Suggested
caseloads for high-risk offenders should be no more than fifty probationers to one
probation officer, according to the Madera County’s implementation plan (McCray,
2012). As the implementation of AB 109 continues, adequate funding must continue to
flow to county probation departments to ensure that the larger numbers of parolees and
the higher risk parolees are properly supervised to protect the community.
California mandated that each county must have completed a Community
Corrections Partnership (CCP) before the implementation date of October 2011. While
most counties have established a CCP, their methods of application may vary from
county to county. However, they all provide an array of intermediate sanctions,
supervision, and alternative treatment options in addition to incarceration. For example,
“Counties can institute Pre-Trial Release Programs with enhanced supervision,
Day Reporting Centers, and flash incarceration in addition to providing behavioral health
assessments and treatment, housing, and employment services” (California Budget, 2012,
p. 74). With realignment changing the way parole and probation will be used in
California, these alternative sentencing options and sanctions could prove to help ease the
strain of overcrowding, not only in state prisons but at the county level as well. With
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proper oversight and necessary treatment services available, this new method of sanctions
can assist in reducing overcrowding and recidivism (California Budget, 2012).
However, the state needs to consider how it plans to augment AB 109 over the next
few years and the efficacy of Governor Brown’s plan. As of May, 2012, the state had
roughly 127,000 inmates and was projected to be 6,000 over the limit at the deadline, and
hopes to meet the reduction mandate by the end of 2013.
Significant Observation 7: AB 109 has had an impact on reducing the state prison
population, however its impact on lowering recidivism has yet to be determined.
In the first six months the state succeeded in achieving the mandated reduction in
the state prison population, although the data to determine whether the desired overall
outcome of lowering recidivism has yet to be collected. The six month time frame was
not a sufficient amount of time to gather adequate data to determine if recidivism rates
went up or down. One change that could be made in the AB 109 plan to avoid a repetition
of past increases in crime and recidivism is an increase in rehabilitation and treatment
programs, so that when inmates are released their likelihood of reoffending drops
significantly. Support services for inmates are what the Probation Subsidy Act lacked,
which caused a spike in reoffending (Kuehn, 1972).
Currently, there is no allocation formula negotiated into the realignment plan
dictating how the counties spend their funding. Instead, they are allocated an amount
based upon historical sentencing figures and can spend it on whatever they want (Taylor,
2011). If the counties have no obligation to provide rehabilitation and treatment to the
“three-nons” prisoners, then AB 109 may lead to unwanted results. In the short term, the
state might meet the prison population reduction mandates through June 2013. In the
long term, a rise in recidivism, possibly including violent crime, is likely without
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rehabilitative programs and treatment services available for prisoners in all counties
(Rushford, 2012).
One method of enforcing the way counties allocated their money is to change the
way it is received from the state. The ACLU made an interesting recommendation for the
state to revise how AB 109 should be funded. Since one of the main goals of this new
policy is to reduce recidivism, the state should incentivize funding to counties that focus
more on crime prevention, treatment and vocational programs instead of incarceration.
The counties with the least amount of recidivism would then receive more funding.

Conclusion
Over the last 30 years, California’s response to the boom in incarceration was to
build more prisons. However, the skyrocketing costs of the CDCR coupled with an
economic downturn have created a massive deficit in the state’s budget. Billions of
dollars later, California is still trying to address its overcrowding issue. Due to prisoners’
rights violations over the years, and two extremely important court cases, SCOTUS
issued a direct federal mandate that ordered California to decrease its inmate population
to 110,000 by June 2013. California responded by instituting a new prison reform policy
that transferred the jurisdiction of low-level offenders from state prisons to county jails.
However, six months into AB 109’s implementation to reduce overcrowding, a possible
disconnect arose among factors that could influence the outcome of this policy. The
seven significant observations within the Analysis each provide a crucial component
supporting this conclusion.
First, the state of California did not evenly disburse funding to the counties, nor
did the state explicitly detail how the funding should be used. Instead, the state made it
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abundantly clear that those counties which have historically chosen the method of
incarceration over rehabilitation, were awarded more funding for this overhaul of prison
reform. This methodology is exactly what has placed California’s state prison system into
its state of crisis. Counties with strong rehabilitative programs, treatment, and alternative
solutions to incarceration have been financially penalized in the first year disbursement of
funding for AB 109. Research suggests that most counties are spending allocated funds
for jail expansions, renovations, and increased staff instead of using the funds to create
programs to address recidivism, the second main initiative of AB 109. However,
“realignment legislation contains no requirement that counties offer community
supervision, treatment, reentry services, or any other alternative” (Silbert, 2012, p. 9).
County officials have argued that they need these modifications and improvements of
their jails in order to accommodate the increased number of offenders placed under their
supervision. Others believe that this may simply cause the burden of overcrowding in the
state prisons to shift to the county level. In order to prevent this from happening, counties
must determine if it would be more effective to release low-risk prisoners with electronic
monitoring instead of building more jails and choosing incarceration over rehabilitation.
Over the next few months, policy disputes will arise over the success of the
realignment plan. One measure will be whether the state meets the SCOTUS mandate by
June 2013. It also may take years of research to understand the greater impact this policy
has on recidivism in California communities. It is clear that this new policy will reduce
overcrowding in California state prisons, but without the proper management of AB 109
funding, and with counties diverting funds for jail expansion and not treatment, the
possibility of overcrowding in county jails becomes likely. This could lead to inmates
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being released early without the proper training, treatment, and rehabilitation needed to
successfully reenter society. In one particular community the early statistics are
worrisome. According to Chief of Police of Fontana Rodney Jones, “As Justice Alito
cautioned, any prison reduction could lead to a grim roster of victims. Since realignment
was implemented, Fontana has realized a 13 percent increase in violent crimes and a 22
percent increase in non-violent crimes” (Fontana, CA, Chamber of Commerce, 2012 p.
1).
California’s realignment policy will need to be thoroughly examined on various
levels. Data will need to be collected to prove or disprove its success rate. Research on
crime rates, reentry programs for offenders, and jail population statistics will need to be
analyzed to derive a possible conclusion on realignment. Each county had autonomy for
financing implementation of the proposed realignment. It would be ideal to study a
particular county before AB 109 went into effect and use those results as a springboard to
compare and contrast any related effects of realignment.
One critical area of importance that needs to be addressed by the CDCR, stems
from the designation of certain convicts as low-level offenders. This labeling can make
offenders eligible for county jail sentences. Many counties have alerted the state that they
have transferred high-risk inmates to their counties instead of low-level offenders.
Counties such as Tuolumne, Calaveras, Merced, Trinity, and San Bernardino, have
questioned the state’s process in diverting offenders to their respective counties.
Currently, the CDCR only monitors a prisoner’s last conviction in assessing his/her risk
to the community. This is an egregious error by the state, and it needs to be promptly
addressed. The state is basically allowing an inmate to have a record that includes high-
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risk criminal activities such as rape or murder, however, if his/her last arrest was for petty
theft or a violation of parole, than he/she is now considered a low-risk offender.
When the new budget is passed for AB 109 in November, policy reforms must
address not only this concern, but the various funding issues, the lack of oversight, the
overcrowding in county jails, recidivism, and other controversial topics that this report
has addressed. After assessing the outcomes and full implementation of AB 109, focus
needs to shift towards long-term efficiency, to create a set of guidelines to ensure AB
109’s overall effectiveness over an extended period of time. These directives, established
by the Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) of California, are addressed below (Taylor,
2011):
•

Develop local funding allocation formulas with an eye towards the longterm, and simplify the structure of the realignment accounts to provide
financial flexibility.

•

Enact statutory changes to give counties appropriate program flexibility.

•

Ensure that local fiscal incentives are aligned with statewide goals.

•

Promote local accountability.

•

Avoid state-reimbursable mandates.

Areas of Future Research
In addition to the LAO’s findings, a longitudinal study of cost savings should be
conducted, along with an enhanced study of recidivism rates after the realignment was
implemented. These recidivism rates would be particularly useful to compare reoffenders
that were sent to the county jails versus similar prisoners that were sent to state prisons.
Study is needed to clearly define the state’s role and funding responsibilities for
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the realignment. Allowing the counties to use the funding without any oversight impairs
the state’s ability to gain unity in such a massive shift in policy. It would be interesting to
see if the counties that were heavily funded implemented any type of treatment services
that were useful or sustainable over time, or if the counties simply used the funding to
expand or remodel jails. Understandably, if they did not include rehabilitative services in
their expenses, justification would be required to support a claim that incarceration is
favorable in comparison to treatment and alternative sentencing, especially since “twothirds of California's 58 counties are already under some form of mandated early release”
(CSA, 2012, p. 1).
Further study will be needed to assess the eventual outcome of Proposition 30.
This ballot measure wrote into the state constitution certain provisions related to the
implementation of AB 109. Additionally, it guaranteed ongoing revenues to local
governments, required the state to share some unanticipated program costs, and restricted
the state’s authority to expand realignment program requirements (Bowen, 2012). More
specifically, it required the state to continue to allocate the specified tax revenues
established in 2011 to local governments to assist in realignment expenses (Bowen,
2012).
Proper risk assessment analysis will also be needed in order to manage the county
jail population. “With the right tools, like a certified risk-assessment program and
electronic monitoring, along with mandatory participation in substance-abuse programs
and community-based service counseling, each county can identify inmates and release
them back into the community with minimal threat to public safety” (Hilliard, 2012, p. 1).
This method would be far more conducive to a successful post-release outcome than
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incarceration or pre-trial detention. According to numbers released by the LAO (2012, p.
8), “At $100 per day, the state’s pretrial population costs taxpayers approximately $1.8
billion annually. That is more than half of California’s $3 billion budget shortfall.”
Study is needed to help the CDCR establish a new clear-cut policy on the criteria
for a low-level offender incorporating prior convictions. Research should be conducted to
determine if the state properly complied with the designation of inmates sent to county
jails. A year-to-year trend, through November 2013, is needed to analyze recidivism rates
of the offenders released, as well as a cost-benefit analysis comparing the expense of
county jail incarcerations versus state prison sentences.
Study is needed on whether and how sentencing patterns have changed after AB
109 had been implemented. Data is needed to determine if District Attorneys are more
inclined to charge criminals with “three-nons” and if judges are more likely to sentence
criminals to terms that keep them within the county jail system instead of sending them to
state prison.
Study is needed to compare five year recidivism rates for specified crimes before
and after AB 109 in order to determine if realignment is just shifting populations from the
state to county level or if there is an actual decrease in incarceration and its related
costs overall.
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